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Abstract
On June 16 2009, in what authorities called \a surprise development" the Turk-
ish Government removed a provision from its existing laws that had allowed Turkish
residents to borrow in foreign currency from banks operating in Turkey. The de-
velopment ended a long era of foreign currency lending in Turkey at least in the
sense of consumer loans. This paper studies the determinants and consequences of
foreign currency lending for banks in Turkey in the run-up to this signicant policy
change. Our analysis uses detailed foreign and Turkish currency composition bank
data for 21 commercial banks in Turkey between 2002 and 2010. We evaluate drivers
of saving and lending in foreign currency(FX) in Turkey along with consequences
for the banking system in particular and for the economy in general. We highlight
possible risks to the Turkish banking system as a result of system's heavy exposure
to both channels. In doing so, we show that the policy change was not necessarily
a surprise but a cautionary step in the right direction to help keep Turkish banking
system stable.
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1 Introduction
On June 16 2009, the Turkish Government removed a provision from its existing laws that
had allowed Turkish residents to borrow in foreign currency from Turkish banks.1 The
development ended the era of foreign currency lending in Turkey at least in the sense of
consumer loans.(Corporations were still allowed to borrow in foreign currency provided
the maturity of the loan is more than a year and the amount nanced is more than 5
million US dollars). The most obvious questions to ask regarding this development are
why and why in 2009? This paper aims to answer these questions by shedding light on
the dynamics of foreign currency(FX) borrowing and lending in Turkey over a span of 8
years prior to the regulatory change(2002-2009). We start our analysis in 2002 as opposed
to earlier for two main reasons:
1. Turkey switches to an ination targeting(IT) regime in 2002.2
2. There have been signicant banking reforms beginning in mid 2001 following the
nancial crisis. We want to concentrate on the post-reform period.
We evaluate drivers of FX saving as well as lending in Turkey along with their conse-
quences. We highlight possible risks to the system as a result of Turkey's heavy exposure
to both channels. We believe analysis of FX lending and saving is important in the case
of Turkey for several reasons. Firstly, as a highly \dollarized" economy, Turkish nancial
system by nature is more vulnerable to changes in the FX rate as opposed to not so
heavily dollarized economies. Sudden currency movements not only eect depositors in
terms of the value of their savings but also they have an impact on banks via defaults on
their foreign currency denominated loans and hence lower protability. Unhedged foreign
currency borrowing is a threat to nancial stability. Previous literature3 has highlighted
the impact of heavy exposure to liability dollarization for banking systems. In that sense,
Turkish regulators move is not necessarily a surprise. Other countries in Europe have
taken similar steps in recent years to curb foreign currency exposure of their banking
systems.4
Figure 1 shows that the foreign currency loans constituted a sizable portion of banks'
loan portfolios until recently ranging from as high as 55% at the end of 2002 to a low
of 27% in 2009.5 Even though, there is a decreasing tendency the average ratio remains
27.9% for the 2008-2010 period. Figure 2 shows the same ratios for the ve largest(in terms
of assets) non-state owned banks in our sample as of second quarter of 2009.6 As can be
seen, all non-state owned banks at the end of the sample period have had foreign currency
loans more than or close to 30% of their total loan portfolios. Such heavy exposure to
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Figure 1: FC Loans to Total Loan Portfolio in the Turkish Banking System
The gure shows the average ratio of foreign currency denominated loans to banks' overall loan portfolio in our sample with +1/-1 Standard
Deviation Bounds.
foreign currency lending is obviously a cause for concern to regulators and may shed light
on the reasons behind the policy change.
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Figure 2: FC Loans to Total Loan Portfolio for the Largest Non-state Banks
The gure shows the ratio of foreign currency denominated loans to overall loan portfolios of the largest non-state owned banks in our sample
2 The Link Between Deposit And Loan Dollarization
Previous research7 has argued that in economies with high deposit dollarization, there
is a tendency for banks to increase their dollar denominated assets in an eort to hedge
themselves against exchange rate risk. However, literature has also showed that such a
strategy by banks is not necessarily hedging but merely a transfer from one form of risk
into another, namely foreign exchange risk into default risk. In this section we investigate
whether the Turkish Banking System exhibits a similar pattern where deposit dollarization
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causes loan dollarization. Our preliminary analysis (as exhibited by Figure 3) of the
liabilities and assets in the Turkish Banking system reveal to us that there is a clear
and positive relationship between the two, yet we need to provide further analysis on the
direction of the causality. In the following sections, we analyze the link between loan and
deposit dollarization in the Turkish Banking system: in section 2.2 we perform an OLS
analysis.
2.1 Data
Our dataset comes from the Bank Association of Turkey website and includes an un-
balanced panel of quarterly income statements and balance sheets of 21 commercial and
deposit banks between the fourth quarter of 2002 and rst quarter of 2010. These banks
represent over 94 percent of the Turkish banking system in terms of their total assets and
over 98 percent in terms of total deposits as of 2010. Table A.1 in the Appendix provides
a list of these banks in our sample as well as their ownership structure and their total
assets in terms of US Dollars as of 2010. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of our
sample. Table A.2 in the Appendix presents denitions of the variables and abbreviations
used throughout the paper.
2.2 OLS Analysis
Figures 3 (below) and A.1 (in the Appendix) show the correlation of foreign currency
deposits to the overall level of foreign currency loans in the sample studied. Figure 3
is at the bank level and Figure A.1 is at the aggregate level8 As shown by the tted
regression line, there is a very strong, linear and positive relationship between foreign
currency deposits and loans.
As a rst exploratory analysis of the ndings presented in these two gures, we estimate
the following regression:
loansfci;t = + depfci;t + i (2.1)
where loansfci;t and depfci;t represent the loans and deposits in foreign currency for bank
i at time t, respectively. The error term is represented by i. We also run a couple of
additional regressions to control for banks' size (based on total assets). Note that the
baseline case corresponds to small banks. We classify banks according to the rankings
of average assets for each quarter.9 We divide the banks in three tertiles. According to
this classication we have 7 banks in each category. We slightly modify equation 2.1 to
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics For Variables
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std:Dev: Skewness Kurtosis Observations
AllBanks
assets 19,368,332 8,142,176 119,000,000 1,169 25,270,818 2 6 543
depfc 5,526,799 2,828,870 32,232,370 518 6,438,746 2 5 526
deptl 7,085,502 2,345,450 71,984,962 - 10,431,434 2 11 526
equity 2,119,087 863,737 13,521,400 - 2,878,367 2 6 567
foreignborrow 2,008,454 558,756 13,929,506 148 3,030,951 2 6 543
loansfc 3,051,468 1,246,553 26,119,169 131 4,507,135 2 9 543
loanstl 5,646,491 2,300,562 34,400,164 263 7,624,862 2 6 543
Tertile1(BigBanks)
assets 45,925,199 39,288,108 118,986,392 8,423,408 26,309,253 1 3 189
depfc 12,226,635 11,137,247 32,232,370 3,099,945 6,266,297 1 3 189
deptl 16,929,532 16,045,124 71,984,962 752,488 12,067,715 2 8 189
equity 5,237,770 4,663,000 13,521,400 548,895 3,074,300 1 3 189
foreignborrow 4,576,906 3,741,556 13,929,506 1,258 3,814,786 1 2 189
loansfc 7,029,670 5,385,987 26,119,169 197,848 5,601,828 1 4 189
loanstl 12,370,210 9,444,857 34,400,164 594,883 9,182,661 1 2 189
Tertile2(Medium  sizeBanks)
assets 8,626,396 7,403,696 30,090,644 1,224,730 5,910,392 1 5 189
depfc 2,857,009 2,415,641 8,474,535 526,826 1,809,680 1 3 189
deptl 2,531,336 2,013,259 11,057,236 252,713 1,987,065 1 5 189
equity 966,038 883,145 3,733,897 43,416 688,389 1 5 189
foreignborrow 992,331 597,548 6,549,007 1,729 1,201,231 2 10 189
loansfc 1,592,497 1,336,789 6,421,149 101,252 1,344,091 2 6 189
loanstl 3,433,971 2,386,855 14,824,478 191,189 3,033,666 1 4 189
Tertile3(Small  sizeBanks)
assets 1,253,047 863,854 4,173,421 1,169 1,051,411 1 3 165
depfc 380,321 213,984 1,626,800 518 334,707 1 4 148
deptl 330,204 200,647 1,463,733 - 352,548 1 4 148
equity 175,775 114,113 608,903 107 134,172 1 3 165
foreignborrow 230,331 164,239 1,111,378 148 225,757 2 6 165
loansfc 165,803 113,468 676,608 131 151,460 1 3 165
loanstl 479,118 200,203 2,030,440 263 569,089 1 4 165
Descriptive statistics for the 21 banks used in our regressions. All gures are in terms of thousands of Turkish Lira. For a description of the variables
see Table A.2 in the Appendix.
capture possible dierences in intercept (Eq. 2.2) and, intercept and slope (Eq. 2.3). The
resulting models are:
loansfci;t = + depfci;t + 1D1 + 2D2 + i (2.2)
loansfci;t = + depfci;t + 1D1depfci;t + 2D2depfci;t + i (2.3)
where,
D1 =
8<:1 , for banks in 1st tertile0 , Otherwise (2.4)
and,
D2 =
8<:1 , for banks in 2nd tertile0 , Otherwise (2.5)
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Figure 3: Foreign Curr. Dep. vs Loans in the Turkish Banking System-Bank Specic
Before proceeding to estimating these equations, we rst checked for the stationarity of
the data using a unit root test for the unbalanced panels (Fisher test). The results suggest
that our dependent variable loansfc and explanatory variable depfc which measures the
level of foreign currency accounts in the banking system are both non-stationary in levels
but not necessarily so in dierences.10
The econometric technique used for the panel is the xed eects model. In order to
test the validity of the use of this model, we use the Hausmann test. The 2(3) = 31:38
and the p = 0:00 show that the dierences in the coecient estimates using Random
Eects and Fixed Eects is systemic,thus supporting the use of the Fixed Eects model.
Results are presented in Table 2. Estimation of Equation 2.1 shows the high, positive
relationship between both variables (R2 = 0:9611.) The F-test for goodness of t of the
model is signicative at the 5% signicance level. One can observe that the value of
 is equal to 0.863427 and is positive and signicant. This coecient tells us that per
each Turkish lira equivalent of foreign currency deposited, an average 0.86 Turkish Lira
equivalent is lent out by the banks. This is more evident in the aggregate case suggesting
that the Turkish banking system as a whole is uncovered against the currency risk and
that there is a direct transference of currency risk to default risk.The results of introducing
dummies to control for changes in the intercept due to banks' size are presented in the
third column (Eq 2.2) and the results for the regression with dummies to control for
changes in slope12 are presented in the fourth column (Eq 2.3).
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Analyzing the three estimations, one can appreciate that all the coecients of depfc
are signicant at 1% meaning that dollar deposits have a positive and signicant inuence
on dollar loans. In this table we can also observe that there is a signicant dierence in
the intercept between large and medium sized banks and there is no signicant dierence
in slope.This implies that even though the average loan in foreign currency is bigger in
big banks, the dollars lent per dollar received(deposits) is the same disregarding the size
of the banks. i.e. the lending behavior is common across all banks.
Another source of variability of the loans in foreign currency can be given by the banks'
liquidity in Turkish Lira. We dene liquidity(liqtl) as the dierence in local currency
deposits (deptl) minus local currency loans (loantl). We expect a negative relationship
between loans in foreign currency and this liquidity measure implies that when banks have
more local currency they prefer to lend in this currency more than using their foreign
currency holdings. To test this idea we include in Equation 2.1 the liquidity measure
(liqtl = deptl   loanstl):
loansfci;t = + (liqtli;t) + depfci;t + i (2.6)
To control for changes in banks' liquidity behavior due to their size in terms of assets we
also modify this equation:
loansfci;t =+ depfci;t + d1  depfci;t + d2  depfci;t + (liqtli;t)
+ #d1  (liqtli;t) + d2  (liqtli;t) + i
(2.7)
The results of these estimations are also presented in Table 2 and they show that as
expected the liquidity in local currency has a negative and signicant impact on the levels
of loans in foreign currency.
We also estimated equations (2.2) to (2.7) with series in dierences(i.e. we made the
series stationary. The results are presented in Table 3. 13
From these ndings, we nd support that changes in foreign currency loans are posi-
tively related to changes in foreign currency deposits. From both equations it is clear that
this relationship is positive and strongly signicant. On the other hand, judging from the
results in Eq. 2.6 we can see that the eect of changes in liquidity in Turkish Liras(liqtl)
do not have an eect on the changes in the amount of foreign currency loans(loansfc).
Given these preliminary results and following Honig (2009) we can argue that as soon
as the loans and deposits stay inside the Turkish economy (no international hedge), banks
are simply transforming their currency risk into a default risk. As it is apparent from the
data, hedge in the Turkish banking system is almost not existent and a systemic shock due
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Table 2: Determinants of Loan Dollarization
Dependent Variable: Level of Foreign Currency Loans
Method Eq.(2.1) Eq.(2.2) Eq.(2.3) Eq.2.6 Eq. 2.7
Time Period 2002q4  2010q1 2002q4  2010q1 2002q4  2010q1 2002q4  2010q1 2002q4  2009q2
C  1; 661; 249  1; 848; 563  1; 541; 604  1; 445; 992 1; 459; 762
(92,081.72) (256,601.5) (101,684.7) (148,777.4) (161,861.7)
depfc 0:863427 0:863531 0:632428 0:913248 0:662426
(0.013847) (0.013848) (0.250084) (0.027704) (0.045132)
D1  depfc 0:236486 0:236111
(0.250212) (0.046275)
D2  depfc 0:119936 0:278592
(0.249803) (0.029628)
liqtl  0:137541  0:065660
(0.027523) (0.040325)
D1  liqtl  0:116968
(0.047973)
D2  liqtl 0:313101
(0.048172)
D1 483; 287:4
(434,145.3)
D2 39; 485:47
(293,952.5)
Adj:R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95
F Test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of banks 21 21 21 21 21
Number of observations 588 588 588 588 588
This table presents the results of Equations (2.1), (2.2),(2.3) and (2.6). depfc is the level of foreign currency deposits for
each bank. liqtl is the liquidity in local currency measured by the dierence in local currency deposits (deptl) and local
currency loans (loantl).D1 is the big bank dummy which takes the value of 1 if the bank's average rank in terms of total
assets for the years for which it reports data falls in the rst tertile.D2 is the medium size bank dummy which takes the
value of 1 if the bank's average rank in terms of total assets for the years for which it reports data falls in the second tertile.
Estimations include cross-section xed eects. * signicant at 10 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; *** signicant at 1
percent.
Table 3: Determinants of Loan Dollarization - First Dierences
Dependent Variable: Level of Foreign Currency Loans- First Dif-
ferences
Eq.(2.1) Eq.(2.6) Eq.(2.1)-log dierence
Time Period 2003q1  2009q2 2003q1  2009q2 2003q1  2009q2
C 63; 137:27 64; 917:09 C 0:027695
(46241.02) (45,300.22) (0.015481)
d(depfc) 0:507075 0:499636 dlog(depfc) 0:942759
(0.085132) (0.087171) (0.015481)
d(liqtl) 0:047118
(0.067176)
Adj:R2 0.39 0.39 0.80
F Test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of banks 21 21 21
Number of observations 502 502 502
This table presents the results of Equations (2.1), (2.2),(2.3) and (2.6). depfc is the level of foreign currency deposits for each
bank.liqtl is the liquidity in local currency measured by the dierence in local currency deposits (deptl) and local currency loans
(loantl). Estimations include cross-section xed eects. * signicant at 10 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; *** signicant at 1
percent.
to default risk facing a currency depreciation is really high. This leads us to investigate
further the conditions and incentives that have led banks to behave this way.
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3 Granger Causality Test & Vector Error Correction
Model Analysis
To be more certain of the relationship between the loan and deposit dollarization, we
have also run the Engle-Granger causality test on the variables in levels, using 4 lags.
Table 4 show the results of these tests. We see that there is a two-way causality between
the two variables, not only deposit dollarization causes loan dollarization but also loan
dollarization causes deposit dollarization. We also run the same test using the variables
in dierences and the results remained unchanged.
Table 4: Granger Causality Test Results
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability
depfc does not Granger Cause loansfc 434 7:964 0.000
loansfc does not Granger Cause depfc 434 8:813 0.000
d(depfc) does not Granger Cause d(loansfc) 412 4:0730 0.003
d(loansfc) does not Granger Cause d(depfc) 412 16:705 0.000
This Table shows the results of the pairwise Granger Causality Tests between foreign
currency loans(loansfc) and foreign currency deposits(depfc) as well as between dierence
in foreign currency loans(dloansfc) and the dierence in foreign currency deposits(ddepfc)
in the Turkish banking system.The number of lags included in both tests is 4.
As a next step we test for cointegration among our variables since we also know that our
series are non-stationary. As Engle and Granger (1987) pointed out a linear combination
of two or more non-stationary series may be stationary and if such a stationary linear
combination exists, the non-stationary time series are said to be cointegrated. We decide
to use the VEC model instead of the VAR one because we wanted to exploit the non-
stationarity of our data to see the existence of a long run relationship. In principle if there
is a 1-to-1 relationship we should have:
loanfc  depfc = 0 (3.1)
if we measure loans as a negative variable and deposits as a positive one, Eq. 3.1 there
must exist a linear combination (a cointegrating vector) that satises that identity. When
we perform the Johansen cointegration test, we nd that there is one cointegrating vector
at the 5% signicance level using either the Trace or the Maximum Eigenvalue tests. The
results are presented in Table 5.
Accordingly to our results, the normalized cointegrating vector is given by [1, 0.944].
In terms of equation (3.1) this result implies that we have not only a long term relationship
but also that the identity almost holds, meaning that indeed Turkish banks per dollar lent
have a dollar deposited. Again, this tells us about the risk transformation in the system.
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Table 5: Johansen Cointegration Test Results
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05 C.V. Prob.**
None* 0.1693 88.7956 15.4947 0.000
At Most 1 0.0091 4.1995 3.8414 0.0404
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
None* 0.1693 84.5959 14.2646 0.0295
At Most 1 0.0091 4.1995 3.8414 0.0404
This Table shows the results of the Johansen Cointegration Tests. Trace test indicates 1
cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s)
at the 0.05 level.* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-
Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.
As soon as we have a cointegrating vector, we can thus use the VEC model to see the
impulse responses of our variables. When we use a VEC model to see impulse responses to
shocks for the two variables, we see that a unit-shock in foreign currency loans increases
deposits and, more interestingly this eect stays for a long period. This is not the case of
loans responding to unit-changes in deposits. We present these results in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Impulse Shock Responses for Foreign Currency Loans and Deposits
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3.1 The Macroeconomic Developments in Turkey
We can explain the relationship between the growth of foreign currency deposits and
foreign currency loans to a great degree by evaluating the developments in the Turkish
economy and in the value of Turkish lira in recent years: As mentioned earlier, Turkish
monetary authorities have been following an implicit ination targeting (IT) regime since
2002 and a full blown IT regime since 2006. During this period the ination rate has
decreased from 45% to 10% in 2009. Following the 2001-2002 crisis, the country has
also switched to a oating exchange rate system. Figure 5 shows the ratio of foreign
currency loans to loans in local currency versus the ination rate for our study period.
The gure suggests ination is highly correlated with the ratio of foreign currency loans
to domestic currency loans. As ination declined, it suggests loans are made more in
domestic currency or the loan growth in terms of Turkish Lira denomination increased at
a higher pace than that of foreign currency loans.
In addition, Turkey has maintained an average gdp growth rate of 5.72% during our
study period. It is natural to expect that demand for loans to increase in a growing econ-
omy regardless of currency denomination.Figure 6 shows the time series representation of
real gdp versus loans in foreign currency and Turkish liras. The correlation between the
real gdp growth and the growth in Turkish Lira denominated loans for the whole study
period is 0.98 while the same ratio is equal to 0.96 with respect to loans in foreign cur-
rency. As can be seen there is a clear relationship between the two variables. The gure
also shows the same correlation gures at dierent intervals within the study period.
During our study period we observe an appreciation of the lira versus other hard cur-
rencies such as the dollar until the Global Financial Crisis.14 The Turkish lira appreciated
27% against the US dollar between the rst quarter of 2003 and the end of 2007. During
this period Turkish banks saw an increase in the number and volume of applications for
loans not only in local but also in foreign currency. The level of foreign currency loans
held by the 21 banks in our study stood at 31.2 billion Turkish liras at the end of 2002.
This number tripled to over 100 billion TL by mid 2008 ,reaching 1.12 billion TL in the
second quarter of 2009. This increase shows borrowers' preference to borrow in foreign
currency as the local currency appreciates. One can argue when local currency is stable
and forecast of future exchange rate is to appreciate, borrowers will prefer to take loans in
foreign currencies due to the fact that their loan commitments in terms of local currency
decreases with an appreciating local currency.15
Figure 7 which shows the ratio of aggregate loans in foreign currency to aggregate
deposits in foreign currency for our sample presents a clear increasing trend during the
13
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The gure above represents the level of Turkish real gdp(gdpreal) against total Turkish lira(loanstl) and the foreign currency(loansfc)
denominated loans extended by the banks in our sample during our study period.All values are in terms of thousand Turkish Liras.
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same period. This ratio goes from around 0.39 in 2002 to almost 0.83 in the rst quarter
of 2009. There is an implication of this nding: The increasing demand for loans in
foreign currency should have increased banks' eorts to supply foreign currency through
various means. During this period, Turkish banks engaged in all or any combination of
the following strategies aimed at sourcing foreign currency:
 Issue dollar denominated securities,16
 Borrow from foreign banks
 attract more foreign currency deposits.
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
loansfc/depfc (Means)
Figure 7: FX Loans to Deposits Ratio-Means
The gure shows the means of the ratio of foreign currency loans(loansfc) to foreign currency deposits(ddepfc) extended by the banks in
our sample.
Moreover, as explained before, demand for loans increased regardless of the currency
denomination. This can be seen in panels 1 and 4 of Figure 8. However, as we can also
observe the deposits in Turkish liras did not catch up with the demand for loans in local
currency(observe in panel 1 that the distance between TL deposits and TL loans decreases
arriving to its minimum at around 2008). This was not the case for the relationship
between FC deposits and FC loans that maintain a ratio of (loansfc=depfc) of around
0.7 during the same period. This decrease in the ratio of TL loans to TL deposits exerted
additional pressure to nd liquidity to cover the loan demand. An evaluation of balance
sheets of the 21 banks in our dataset reveals some evidence that indeed Turkish banks
engaged in these three methods.
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Figure 8: FC and TL Liquidity,Banks' Foreign Borrowing and the Exchange Rate
In the gure above, Panel 1 shows the level of banks' deposits in Turkish liras vs. their loans in Turkish liras(a measure we call as their \tl
liquidity"); Panel 2 illustrates banks' foreign borrowing versus their liquidity in Turkish liras(tl liquidity) and in foreign currency(measured
by the dierence between FC deposits and FC loans); Panel 3 shows the level of foreign borrowing by banks in the sample versus the TL-USD
exchange rate; Panel 4 illustrates banks' liquidity in foreign currency.
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Firstly, foreign borrowing by Turkish banks accelerates signicantly especially after
2003 as can be seen in the third panel in Figure 8. Also in the second panel of Figure 8
we show banks' liquidity positions (measured by dierence between deposits and loans)
in foreign currency as well as in Turkish liras. As can be seen especially after 2006 the
dierence between Turkish lira deposits and Turkish lira loans falls signicantly and the
amount of borrowing from foreign banks increase. This could suggest that the latter
constituted a source of funding for the increase in Turkish currency loans.
Secondly, we also observe that securitization activity by Turkish banks have increased
dramatically during this period.17 The total securitization activity by the banks in our
sample increased from 887 million Tl(624 mil USD) in 2004 to over 6.4 billion TL(4.7 bill
USD) in 2005 and to 5.6 billion TL(3.9 bil USD) in 2006.With the gradual improvement of
their liquidity in Turkish lira terms and the worsening of the conditions in the international
capital markets we see banks' foreign borrowing volume tapering o to 3.2 billion TL in
2007 and nally to around 1 billion TL in 2008. In the third panel of Figure 8 we present
the fx rate compared with foreign borrowing of Turkish banks. We can clearly observe
that foreign borrowing and the changes in the exchange rates(TL per USD) are related.
During 2007 the coecient of correlation is -0.98 and during 2008 the same gure becomes
+0.91. It is also important to note that the Turkish lira has appreciated during this period
of heavy foreign borrowing by Turkish banks.
To further understand the relationship between these variables we perform a regression
analysis on changes of foreign currency borrowing by Turkish banks.
d(foreignborrowt) = + d(deptl + depfc)t + d(loantl + loanfc)t + i (3.2)
Our aim is to see if the banks use some of the foreign borrowing to increase their
Turkish Lira loans. We cannot nd strong evidence that banks use foreign currency
borrowing to cover their loans in Turkish liras. It appears the banks in our sample borrow
from foreign sources but use it mostly to cover the dierence between foreign currency
deposits and foreign currency lending, they do not convert the foreign currency loans
to Turkish currency and lend this money. Thus the mechanism of exchange rate should
be related to consumers' (rms, governments, people) preference with regards to their
loans. They must have preferred to exchange their loans into the local currency, thus
appreciating the Turkish lira. Note also that this transition mechanism can explain why
in 2008-2009 the Turkish lira depreciates even though the foreign currency deposits in the
banking sector were still growing. This could be related to the sudden depreciation of the
lira from mid 2008 to mid 2009(the last panel in Figure 8). It looks as if this movement
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was created by short-term capital moving back to the US or to other developed markets
out of Turkey. What is also interesting is that during this period there is a decrease in
Turkish lira loans that improved Turkish lira liquidity for banks and that foreign currency
operations (deposits and loans) continued in their increasing trend. This tells us that
banks as well as their customers saw this sudden depreciation as a temporal break (indeed
this period corresponds to nancial meltdown of global nancial markets) and not as a
structural one. The results can be seen in the Table 6.We can appreciate that only the
total loans exert a positive and signicant eect on foreign borrowing. It appears the
change in the level of foreign currency loans have a signicant and positive explanatory
power over the changes in banks' foreign borrowing and the changes in the level of loans
in Turkish Lira has a small positive but not signicant impact. This suggests that the
banks separate the two sources of funds and treat them independently of each other.
We perform a second estimation by using the disaggregated level of loans and deposits
irregardless of their denomination. The results suggest that it is the loans that are the
most important drivers of Turkish Banks' decision to seek funding from foreign banks.
d(foreignborrowt) = + d(loantlt) + d(loanfct) + i (3.3)
Previous literature such as Allen and Saunders (1986) and Cocco, Gomes, and Martins
(2009) have shown that other bank-specic variables such as the size of borrower bank's
assets, its market share, size of its non-performing loan ratio and the amount of its surplus
deposits have a signicant eect on the amount borrowed in the inter-bank market. To be
more through in our methodology, of these variables, we include the change in the bank's
overall equity (d(equity)), changes in total assets(d(assets)) and changes in the bank's
market share(d(mktshare)) as measured by the share of bank's deposits to the overall
deposits in the sample at time t. As we can see in Table 6 equity and market share have
a negative and signicant eect on the foreign funding banks can secure; the larger the
equity and the market share of the bank(a measure of bank's size), the lower the need for
loans from external sources. The larger the changes in bank's assets are the more need it
has for foreign loans.
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Table 6: Determinants of Turkish Banks' Foreign Currency Borrowing
Dependent Variable: d(foreignborrow) - Change in the Level of Foreign Currency Borrowing
Method OLS Cross-Section Fixed Eects
Equation Eq.3.3 Eq. 3.2
Time Period 2003q1  2009q2 2003q1  2009q2 2003q1  2009q2 2003q1  2009q2
C  463; 861:2 24,284.46 C -19,387.94 4,932.367
-91,6176.3 -25,333.99 -21,920.8 22,163.84
d(loantl) 0:062 0.033035 d(deptl + depfc) -0.02  0:197
-0.027 (0.038728) -0.019 (0.028)
d(loanfc) 0:379 0:160333 d(loantl + loanfc) 0:231 0:090
-0.029 (0.0414) (0:0245) (0:028)
d(equity)  0:421332 d(equity)  0:463
-0.063333 (0.060)
d(assets) 0:0842 d(assets) 0:215
(0:0183) (0:023)
d(mktshare)  8; 185; 055 d(mktshare)  4; 373; 210
-2,975,604 (2,827,221)
Adj:R2 0:278 0.408 0.209 0.459
No:ofobservations 519 502 502 502
This table presents the results of estimations on the changes in the foreign borrowing by Turkish banks estimated by Equation 3.3and over
sources and uses of funds estimated by using Equation 3.2. All estimations include country and xed eects. Standard errors are presented
in parenthesis. * signicant at 10 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; *** signicant at 1 percent.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have contributed to the literature on the dynamics of foreign currency
lending and saving by focusing on an emerging market setting, the case of Turkey. Turkey
is particularly interesting to study for this topic as the country has enjoyed high rates of
economic growth recently coupled with an expansion of credit both in local and foreign
currency terms. Additionally, the regulatory authorities in Turkey has recently tightened
credit to households by ending the practice of foreign currency lending by the country's
banks. This is an interesting development and has denitely played an important role in
our motivation for this paper.
By using a dataset which includes an unbalanced panel of quarterly income statements
and balance sheets of 21 commercial and deposit banks between the fourth quarter of 2002
and rst quarter of 2010, we rst showed that dollar deposits have a positive and signicant
inuence on dollar loans in Turkey. Our results also point out to a signicant dierence
between large and medium sized banks in terms of their foreign currency lending meaning
that bigger banks do more lending in foreign currency. Yet despite the average loan in
foreign currency is bigger in big banks, the ratio of dollars lent per dollar received(deposits)
is the same for all banks irregardless of their size. This nding suggests that the lending
behavior is common across all banks in our sample. Then we proceeded to see whether
the liquidity in local currency has a negative and signicant impact on the levels of loans
in foreign currency. And as expected our estimations did show that the eect of changes
in liquidity in Turkish Liras(liqtl) do not have an eect on the changes in the amount
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of foreign currency loans(loansfc). Given these results and following Honig (2009) one
can argue that Turkish banks are simply transforming their currency risk into a default
risk. As it is apparent from the data, hedge in the Turkish banking system is almost
not existent and a systemic shock due to default risk facing a currency depreciation is
really high. This leads us to investigate further the conditions and incentives that have
led banks to behave this way. In doing so, we believe the following explanations explain
the relationship between growth of foreign currency deposits and foreign currency loans
in the Turkish case:
 The falling ination rate as a result of the IT regime in Turkey;
 The increased demand for loans in general not only in Turkish liras but also in
foreign currency as a result of high growth rates experienced in the country during
the study period;
 An appreciation of the lira versus other currencies during the study period.
To overcome the increasing demand for loans in foreign currency, our analysis reveals
that Turkish banks have responded by issuing dollar denominated securities in interna-
tional markets, by borrowing from other banks(the most common form) and by attracting
more currency deposits. Yet our analysis also shows that banks separate the Turkish lira
and the foreign currency sources of their funds and treat them independently.
The ndings of this research help us understand the decision taken by the regulatory
authorities in Turkey in 2009. An unhedged banking system is vulnerable to sudden
exchange rate movements and we believe this is what the regulators saw as they made their
policy change. As seen in earlier emerging market crises(i.e. The East Asian Financial
Crisis) mismatch on banks' and nancial institutions' balance sheets can have devastating
contagious eects on an economy during sudden exchange rate movements. In that sense,
the decision to end the practice of foreign currency lending in Turkey is an understandable
one and indeed it is policy decision taken at the right time for the right reasons.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Banks in the sample(Alphabetical)
Bank Name Ownership Group (as of 2010) Total Assets as of 2010Q3(mil USD)
Akbank Non-state owned - Domestic 72,460.13
Alternatif Bank Non-state owned - Domestic 2,820.70
Anadolubank Non-state owned - Domestic 3,126.23
Arap Turk Bankasi Non-state owned - Foreign 694.08
BankPozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi Non-state owned - Domestic 1,031.36
Denizbank Non-state owned - Domestic 17,204.37
Eurobank Tekfen Non-state owned - Foreign 2,838
Finans Bank Non-state owned - Foreign 23,454.34
Fortis Bank Non-state owned - Foreign 7,759.88
HSBC bank Non-state owned - Foreign 10,597.03
ING Bank Non-state owned - Foreign 11,470.28
Sekerbank Non-state owned - Domestic 7,382.60
Tekstil Bankasi Non-state owned - Domestic 1,498.26
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi Non-state owned - Domestic 11,620.37
Turkish Bank Non-state owned - Domestic 631.32
Turkiye Is Bankasi Non-state owned - Domestic 86,482.10
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi Non-state owned - Domestic 78,635.06
Turkiye Halk Bankasi State owned - Domestic 48,206.47
Turkiye Vakiar Bankasi State owned - Domestic 49,958.55
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi Non-state owned - Domestic 51,405.33
Ziraat Bank Non-state owned - Domestic 95,244.34
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey
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Table A.2: Variable Denitions
Symbol Definition
assets Bank's Total Assets (both in Turkish liras and in
foreign currency)
depfc Bank Deposits in Foreign Currency(denominated in
Turkish lira terms)
deptl Bank Deposits in Turkish Liras
equity Bank's total equity in Turkish Liras
foreignborrow Bank's Total Outstanding Loans from Foreign
Sources
gdpreal Gross Domestic Product in millions of Turkish Liras
mktshare Bank's market share in terms of deposits
liqtl Bank's liquidity position in terms of Turkish Liras
measured by the dierence in local currency deposits
(deptl) minus local currency loans (loantl)
loansfc Bank Loans in Foreign Currency
loanstl Bank Loans in Turkish Liras
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Figure A.1: FC Deposits vs Loans in the Turkish Banking System-Aggregate
Notes
1A new provision was added to Decree No. 32, "the Law Regarding the Protection of Value of Turkish
Currency" which enabled Turkish banks to provide foreign currency loans to Turkish residents provided
that the average maturity of each loan is more than one year and the loan amount is more than USD5 mil.
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On the other hand, following these amendments Turkish residents were now only able to obtain foreign
indexed loans from Turkish banks for commercial or professional purposes, which meant that Turkish
banks could no longer provide foreign indexed consumer loans.The law was made eective immediately.
For more information see Pekin and Pekin at www.pekin-pekin.com.
2Though implicitly at rst, the IT regime becomes full-edged in 2006. During the period ination
has decreased from over 70% to below 10%. For more information on Turkey's IT Regime see (Akyurek,
Kutan, and Yilmazkuday 2011).
3such as (Kutan, Ozsoz, and Rengifo 2010) have shown that banks in dollarized economies have lower
protability and are more risk averse.
4In Hungary, Latvia and Poland banks are required to disclose the exchange rate risks of FX loans
to clients and regulators have tightened the eligibility criteria for such loans. In countries like Croatia,
Kazakhstan and Romania stronger provisioning requirements were also imposed on FX compared to local
currency loans. Ukraine even completely banned FX lending to households in late 2008.(Brown and Haas
2010)
5The range of this ratio was 3%(Ziraat Bank 2009Q2) - 85%(Finansbank 2003Q1) during our sample
period.
6For a denition of what constitutes a \big-bank" see Section 2.2 Equation 2.1.
7such as Kutan, Ozsoz, and Rengifo (2010)and De Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2005).
8In both gures, the amount of foreign currency loans and deposits are denoted in their Turkish Lira
equivalent amounts. We understand this might inate the level of the loans when Turkish Lira appreciates
and vice versa. This might also be a factor in the high correlation between the two variables. However, we
cannot use the foreign currency amounts of the two variables since the data from the Banks Association
of Turkey is in Turkish Liras.
9We observe that banks do not shift between categories often.
10We acknowledge that the data is non-stationary, but we also perform the analysis in levels because
there is a clear relationship between both variables and what we intend is to determine tendencies. The
Levin, Lin & Chu t-values for loansfc and depfc are 5.27 (100% probability) and 3.73 (99% probabil-
ity)respectively.
11Such a high R2 is natural because our series are non-stationary and they comove. However, this
co-movement is not spurious and has intuitive and economic meaning.
12We also tested for changes in the slope and intercept and none of the parameters were signicant.
13We are only reporting the dierence equations for eq 2.1 and eq 2.6 since the dummy variables are
not relevant anymore when we use dierences.We also cannot estimate eq 2.6 using log dierences since
the liquidity measure has negative values for almost half of our sample.
14As the eects of the crisis fade we can see the appreciation trend of the lira returns.
15Honig (2009) also supports this notion and argues that with stable fx rates borrowers will choose to
borrow in USD terms rather than in local currency.
16Since 2004 Turkish banks have successfully sold USD or Euro denominated trade nance or credit
card based securities in international markets.
17Of the 21 banks in our sample, 14 have successfully issued securities mostly for trade receivables in
international markets during the study period.
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